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Afghanistan’s Lessons: Part II

Norway’s Lessons
Harald Høiback
©2019 Harald Høiback

ABSTRACT: This article argues Norway’s minor role in the
Afghanistan War (2001–14) included opportunities to learn
about the evolution of military deployments over the course of
a prolonged counterinsurgency-focused conflict, the civilian and
military dynamics, and the political challenges of contributing to
such a conflict.

A

fter the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in
September 2001, Norway expressed sympathy for the United
States and took precautionary measures to avoid being attacked.1
Not knowing whether this had been a single burst of hyperterrorism or
the start of a bigger wave, the United Nations Security Council, where
Norway had a seat in 2001, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
soon expressed their support for the United States. Whether Norway
should do anything concrete, apart from showing solidarity through
words and resolutions, was an open question.
On September 10, 2001, the day before the attack, the Norwegian
Labour Party of then Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg lost the general
election. Two days after the attack, outgoing minister of defense Bjørn
Tore Godal, stated it was unlikely Norway would participate in any
operations to find and punish the terrorists.2 The government also said
NATO’s decision to invoke Article 5 did not automatically imply Norway
would participate in any of the organization’s missions connected to the
attack. This surprisingly outspoken reluctance on the part of Norway
was noted in the United States: the New York Times reported Norway had
officially distanced itself from NATO’s solidarity decision.3 Parts of the
Norwegian media also criticized the outgoing Labour government for
not standing by Norway’s most important ally.4
The Norwegian government had several reasons for its reluctance
in this matter. Primarily, it was unclear if the Americans would ask for
assistance in Afghanistan. Perhaps, instead, the United States would
request European nations increase forces in the Balkans to relieve
American troops there. Second, Norwegian armed forces were rather
stretched after another round of post-Cold War cutbacks. Most of
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Norway’s expeditionary military hardware was, or had recently been,
deployed to the Balkans. Third, it was difficult to imagine Norwegians
fighting alongside American soldiers in central Asia. What was actually
at stake for Norway in Afghanistan? Expeditionary warfare in that area
would be unprecedented and completely out of the Norwegian character.
All this changed, however, when the new government assumed control.

New Government and Political Determination

On October 19, 2001, the new center-right coalition government
took office. The new government’s primary security policy concerns
became virtually the opposite of the previous Labour government. What
would happen to Norway’s interests and position in NATO if it did
not participate in what could turn into a major undertaking involving
all our closest partners? If the greater part of NATO supported the
United States tangibly in the war against terrorism, it could be awkward
for Norway to stay out in the short term, and even dangerous in the
long run.
Norway’s main worry since the Second World War has been its
geographic isolation from the European mainland—contending with
Russian maneuvers alone is not a comfortable thought. Hence, regardless
of the feasibility of a coalition operation in Afghanistan, Norway had
to participate. Even if operations ended in a quagmire, it would serve
Norway’s interests to be part of the debacle rather than stay home. A
dysfunctional NATO with a tangible US presence was preferable to no
NATO and the possibility of American isolationism.
Consequently, the new minister of defense, Kristin Krohn Devold,
of the Conservative Party, saw it as her mission to get Norwegian boots
on the ground in Afghanistan as soon as possible: “It was important
to signal our support to the Americans by deploying forces quickly. To
be relevant, we needed to be over there by Christmas.”5 But in the fall
of 2001, boots suitable for Afghan terrain and American needs were
not available. After some months of preparation, the Norwegian
government sent a small detachment of special forces to operate from
Kandahar as part of Task Force K-Bar, a unit of mine clearers for
the airports at Kandahar and Bagram, and a contingent of one C-130
Hercules cargo aircraft and six F-16 Fighting Falcons to be stationed
at Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan.6 While small in number, the initial
Norwegian contribution was significant in terms of skills and quality.
Norway’s first participation in an operation “outside the wire” occurred
on January 15, 2002.7

5      Kristin Krohn Devold in John Inge Hammersmark, “Norske spesialstyrker-Fra skjult ressurs til
politisk spydspiss,” Forsvarets Stabsskole, Militære Studier 3 (2015), 71.
6      Norwegian Commission on Afghanistan (NCA), A Good Ally: Norway in Afghanistan 2001–
2014, Official Norwegian Report NOU 2016:8 (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Ministry of Defense, June 6, 2016), 70.
7      NCA, Good Ally, 55.
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Increased Contributions and Success
With the call for convening a Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) in Kabul in
December 2003, US pressure on allies for further contributions increased.
The Ministry of Defence recommended in October [2003] that Norway
offer a company to carry out security and guard duty. This would be a highprofile assignment that would [further] demonstrate Norway’s ability and
willingness to support [the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
and] alliance efforts in Afghanistan. The assignment was also well suited to
the [newly reorganized] Telemark Battalion.8

Norway was willing to let the company stay in Kabul for one year
after the end of the Loya Jirga. Moreover, in the summer of 2004, Norway
also volunteered to take the lead of one of the three battle groups in the
Kabul Multinational Brigade. The Norwegian Battle Group 3 (BG3)
was a significant contribution to the mission. The headquarters staff
comprised 40 officers including 31 Norwegians, 8 Hungarians, and 1
Italian. In the Norwegian context, this was a robust staff, resembling
a staff for a Norwegian brigade.9 Furthermore, BG3 included three
maneuver elements reflecting the composition of the headquarters
staff—one Norwegian, one Hungarian, and one Italian company.
In many ways, BG3 was a success story. The Norwegian Army
found the mission important, feasible, and militarily relevant, and
experiences drawn from this mission could be utilized back home. It
was soon evident, however, that Norway would have to get involved
in establishing the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). As a result,
Norway came to an important juncture where military considerations
pointed in one direction, that is, stay the course in Kabul, while political
considerations pointed another, that is, operate a PRT.

Failures and Complications

According to the Norwegian Commission on Afghanistan, “in
December 2003, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked
Norway directly to participate in establishing new PRTs.”10 In essence,
the choice was to join either a British or a German PRT in northern
Afghanistan. For several reasons, Norway chose the British-led PRT
being established in Meymaneh in the Faryab province in northwestern
Afghanistan together with Finnish forces. Approximately 30 Norwegians
deployed to the PRT in July 2004.11
While the PRT deployment added to Norway’s main contribution in
Kabul, the NATO secretary general signaled expectations that countries
such as Norway should not only participate in PRTs but eventually
assume command of one. The Norwegian military leadership was
highly critical of taking on such a responsibility and recommended,
8      NCA, Good Ally, 58 (italics in the original).
9     NCA, Good Ally, 58; and Lars Lervik, “Norwegian battlegroup 3/Kabul Multinational
Brigade/ISAF: Erfaringer fra multinasjonal bataljonstridsgruppe i Kabul,” Norsk militært tidsskrift 176, no.
2 (2006): 13.
10      NCA, Good Ally, 59.
11      NCA, Good Ally, 59.

TOC

42

Parameters 49(4) Winter 2019–20

instead, continuing efforts in Kabul with a brigade command element
and a company-sized unit. According to the Norwegian defense staff,
considerations involving budgeting, personnel, security, competencies,
materiel, and profiling, all pointed toward continuing to concentrate
efforts in Kabul rather than assuming responsibility for a PRT.
The military was also concerned that assuming responsibility for
the PRT in Meymaneh would give rise to expectations Norway would
take on further obligations in the event of the withdrawal of other
actors, particularly Britain. Having responsibility for a province, such
as Faryab, could make withdrawing difficult, if it became necessary.
Moreover, the military had no previous experience mentoring, advising,
and reconstructing on foreign soil while simultaneously defending
against enemy attacks. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Defense saw it as
politically desirable to take a more active role in the ISAF expansion
by concentrating Norway’s presence in the north while simultaneously
reducing its presence in Kabul considerably in the spring of 2006.12
In addition to employing the PRT in Meymaneh during March
2006, Norway also “deployed a robust company battle group of roughly
200 troops, including a battalion staff, to Mazar-i Sharif in order to
relieve a British force. This new company was a quick reaction force
under German command in Regional Command North [the ISAF
command with responsibility for northern Afghanistan].” 13 Compared
to the BG3, the quick reaction force was bigger and more mechanized.
While BG3 had been based on foot patrols in an urban setting, the
quick reaction force needed to be able to support PRTs and other units
in the region, and thus be more resilient and mobile. This was also a
deployment well-suited for Telemark Battalion, which was in a process
of converting from a conscription-based unit to a fully professional unit,
something new to the Norwegian armed forces.14 But in 2008, as the
size of the PRT steadily increased, Norway terminated its contribution
to the quick reaction force and concentrated efforts in Meymaneh and
the wider Faryab province.
Unlike the BG3 experience, the PRT endeavor was not a success.
Neither the Norwegian government nor the military leadership initially
knew what a PRT was or what it should do. And although at its strongest
point the Norwegian PRT counted several hundred soldiers, this force
was nonetheless insufficient to meet the demands of a province the size
of Faryab, and no coherent Norwegian strategy was developed for it.
Instead, the PRT commanders filled their six months in the theater
with whatever they found reasonable. Moreover, the experience was not
especially relevant for the Norwegian Army’s tasks back home.
Complicating matters further, the Norwegian government
instituted a clear separation between civilian and military activities
12      NCA, Good Ally, 59.
13      NCA, Good Ally, 60.
14      Arne Opperud, “Ledelse i strid-spørsmål om krig,” i Intops, norske soldater-internasjonale operasjoner,
ed. Dag Leraand (Oslo: Forsvarsmuseet, 2012), 330.
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in Afghanistan. Particularly, the major Norwegian nongovernmental
organizations, heavily subsidized by Norwegian taxpayers, did not
appreciate Norwegian soldiers doing their organization’s work, arguing
military personnel are not trained for development assistance tasks and
therefore, tend to take a short-term view of development work.
Ultimately, this civil-military compartmentalization was inconsistent
with the strategy of counterinsurgency operations that came to guide
ISAF operations. The lack of clear guidelines from Oslo on how to
bridge this gap led to frustration among Norwegian civilian and
military personnel on the ground. The Norwegian government’s 2009
Faryab strategy did not make matters any easier as it contained no clear
guidelines for practitioners.
In total, Norway spent about 20 billion Norwegian kroner
(approximately $3.17 billion) on its engagement in Afghanistan. From
2001 to 2014, military expenditures accounted for about $11.5 billion
and civilian aid accounted for about $8.4 billion. This amounted to a
mere 0.26 percent of the estimated total international military effort,
and 2.3 percent of the total international aid in the period.15 Norway was
thus a relatively much bigger civilian than military contributor, ranking
ninth among civilian contributions.

Major and Minor Contributions

From 2002 to 2009, Norway experienced two main stages in its
deployments to Afghanistan. The first stage was Kabul-centric, which
then evolved into a second, PRT-centric stage in Faryab. After 2009,
the third and last stage took an Afghan security forces-centric approach
where Norwegian forces concentrated most of their efforts on training
and mentoring Afghan forces in support of ISAF’s plans to transfer
“responsibility for national security to Afghan authorities and security
forces by the end of 2014.” 16 The main instruments for this effort were
the operational mentoring and liaison teams.
Apart from these larger stages of Norwegian involvement in
Afghanistan, Norway also contributed additional forces for shorter and
longer periods, such as the commander of the then Kabul International
Airport, provision of F-16s to ISAF, and support to different military
staffs and field hospitals.17 The most important of these, however,
was and still is the special forces training of the Afghan police Crisis
Response Unit 222 in Kabul. The Norwegian special forces and the
Intelligence Service also closely cooperated as part of the national
intelligence support team to develop a concept where the full resources
of the Intelligence Service were directly available to the special forces
in the field.

15      NCA, Good Ally, 213.
16      NCA, Good Ally, 139.
17      NCA, Good Ally, 70.
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Assessment and Lessons Learned

So far, this story about Norway’s military contribution to the
operations in Afghanistan presumably resembles that of many midsize
European states. But in November 2014, the parliament decided to
appoint an independent commission to evaluate the entire Norwegian
endeavor. The Norwegian Commission on Afghanistan, established by a
royal decree on November 21, 2014, worked for 18 months with a broad
mandate to evaluate and to draw lessons from all parts of the Norwegian
engagement in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014.18
The ten-member commission was chaired by retired Labour
politician Bjørn Tore Godal, who had been both minister of foreign
affairs and minister of defense. Lieutenant General Torgeir Hagen was
the only other nonacademic expert in the group. A Dane, Professor
Sten Rynning, from the University of Southern Denmark served on
the commission. And several members were well-known critics of
the operations in Afghanistan. A full-time secretariat of five, later six,
members supported the commission in its work.
The report, which was translated into English, gives an historical
overview of Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan from 2001 to
2014 that includes chapters on military engagement, development aid,
the PRT in Faryab, peace diplomacy, and international law.19 While
neither Norwegian nor other attempts to negotiate a settlement were
successful, Norway was one of the first countries to develop contacts
with the Taliban, and peace diplomacy was an important Norwegian
contribution. In the last part of the report, the commission spells out its
conclusions and draws a range of lessons.
The commission argued Norway had three overarching objectives
in Afghanistan: support the United States and NATO, help combat
international terror, and assist in building a stable and democratic
Afghan state. The commission found, by and large, Norway had achieved
the first objective, that is, supported the United States and bolstered
NATO’s continued relevance. After a slow and reluctant start, Norway
behaved like a good ally. The nation realized only partial success in
achieving the second objective, fighting international terror. It failed to
rid Afghanistan of international groups, and international terrorism is
still an issue worldwide. The final objective, build a stable and democratic
Afghanistan, was and continues to be a downright failure. Democratic
institutions are still fragile, and the war continues.
In summary, the commission was clear the Norwegian contribution
was a very small piece in a very large puzzle: Norway could make little
overall difference in Afghanistan. There are many reasons why so
many nations with so many resources achieved so little in Afghanistan.
Presumably, the most important reason is too many of the objectives

18      NCA, forematter to Good Ally.
19      NCA, Good Ally, 21–47.
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and approaches used in Afghanistan were internally inconsistent
and contradictory.
The report did not stir much political controversy. All major
parties in the parliament had been in the cabinet for the duration of
the Afghanistan War, and as a result, there were no incentives for
political finger-pointing in the parliament. The initial media response
to the report’s findings, however, was significant and concerned
civilian engagement in Afghanistan to a much greater degree than
military engagement.
As stated above, Norway was a bigger player on the civilian side of
the Afghanistan engagement than it was on the military side, suiting
Norwegian politicians quite well. But the Norwegian press persistently
focused on the fact military expenditures in Afghanistan exceeded those
of civilian expenditures. In order to counterbalance this publicity and
the strong military footprint in Afghanistan more generally, in 2007, the
Stoltenberg government decided to spend the same amount on civilian
aid as it did on military activities in Afghanistan. Consequently, Norway
poured 750 million Norwegian kroner annually into a system with
low absorptive capacity.20 Despite assurances to the contrary, aid had
been pushed by political needs in Norway, not pulled by humanitarian
end developmental needs in Afghanistan. When the commission’s
report described how Afghanistan had been turned into one of the
world’s most aid-dependent countries, and how the enormous amount
of aid had contributed to widespread corruption, Norway’s media
responded harshly.
Even though the government invested time and money in the
commission’s work, the extent to which it had any impact on armed
forces’ doctrines and modus operandi is questionable. Few in the military
showed any misgivings regarding the appointment of the commission,
its members, or its findings. Most saw it as proper and reasonable
to use time and money to look at the entire endeavor. Even though
many recognized the important observations and recommendations
made by the commission, the military had already identified lessons
and implemented those relevant to future missions long before the
publication of the report.

Changing Warfare and Cultural Shifts

Thus far, this article has investigated Norway’s contribution
to Afghanistan. The article will conclude by turning the table and
examining what the Afghan endeavor did to Norway. During the
1990s, it was taken for granted in the armed forces that Norwegian
politicians would not accept a big butcher’s bill from far-off wars of
choice. Norway had suffered casualties in Lebanon, the Balkans, and
in UN operations elsewhere. But these were few and far between, and
most were caused by accidents. That changed when Norway joined the
coalition in Afghanistan.
20      NCA, Good Ally, 86.
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In all, over 9,000 Norwegian men and women served with the
military in Afghanistan. Ten lost their lives and 19 were seriously
injured.21 Compared to countries like Denmark, 10 is not a big number,
and the government and Norway could seemingly have stomached a lot
more. Coffins draped with Norwegian flags were not a political liability,
as we in the military previously thought. To the contrary: an important
part of being a good ally was political willingness to pay the price in
blood, not only in money.
In 1999, the Norwegian government had been uncomfortable
with Norway’s participation in Operation Allied Force against Serbia
over Kosovo. One of the senior cabinet members, Valgerd Svarstad
Haugland, was later harshly criticized for stating, “I don’t like bombs”
in the parliament, while her own government was sending Norwegian
F-16s to the area.22 Still, the F-16s did not participate in the actual
fighting, which was in-line with Norwegian traditions, equipment, and
national character.
After 10 years in Afghanistan, the situation had turned upside
down. Norwegian politicians had softened toward bombs and combat,
as demonstrated over Libya in 2011, and had reinvigorated the highestranking decoration for gallantry, the War Cross with Sword, in 2009.
Only heroes from the Second World War had been decorated with the
medal, which was shelved 60 years earlier in 1949.23 Furthermore, the
center-left government of Jens Stoltenberg reinstated the medal.24
If it was surprising the way the Norwegian government tolerated
casualties, it was not particularly surprising they practiced a form
of hands-off strategy. As we saw above, former Minister of Defense
Devold’s main concern was to get Norwegian boots on the ground in
Afghanistan. When they arrived, the political mission was accomplished,
so to speak. Military activities in theater were not on the political radar
back home. Every politician in Norway knew, regardless of the outcome
in Afghanistan, it would not decide Norwegian elections. For Norway,
Afghanistan was not a puzzle to be solved, and the challenge was left
to others, particularly the Americans and the British. Our puzzle, as a
medium-to-small participant in the operation, was how to be part of a
solution in Afghanistan and not part of the problem.
This situation meant, in principle, Norway had no caveats. But
in practice, it did, triggering tensions between the military and the
government. In particular, parts of the armed forces deplored the
government’s decision not to deploy to the southern part of Afghanistan
where the fighting was heavier than up north. Some in the armed
forces believed we should have been where our closest allies were,
not where Germans and Swedes were, so to speak. Additionally, the
strategic laissez-faire, favoring presence over practice, left considerable
21      NCA, Good Ally, 12.
22      Erik Solheim, Nærmere (Oslo: N.W. Damm, 1999), 413.
23      NCA, Good Ally, 203–4.
24      NCA, Good Ally, 204.
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operational leeway for Norwegian military units. Much of what we did
in Faryab was, in fact, military activity in search of a strategic plan or
political intention. And even though Norwegians like to be portrayed
as citizens of a peace-loving nation, our soldiers had no problems filling
their days with combat if they could find it, regardless of lack of strategy.
As stated in the commission’s report:
Frustration among some soldiers at never experiencing “troops in contact”
(TIC) situations before returning home can serve as motivation to actively
seek out combat, even though it may interfere with achieving strategiclevel objectives. This was also pointed out by some veterans themselves:
“The paradox is that all the shooting is what gets the attention,” said Tor.
“Exaggerating somewhat, one could say that we hand out medals and
awards to soldiers when there is shooting, not when we complete our task
in peace and harmony like we are supposed to.” This was a widely held view
also among soldiers in the field.25

Often, less recognition was given to soldiers who successfully
completed assignments with minimal or no use of force, although
decorations were awarded for actions not involving force. Perhaps due
to some form of bad political conscience, operations in Afghanistan
also gave a considerable boost to Norwegian veterans. Long before
2001, Norway had produced veterans from foreign wars, particularly in
Lebanon and the Balkans, but the veterans were not a very self-confident
group. This changed during Norway’s involvement in Afghanistan.
Even the Norwegian officer corps changed. Until recently, Norway was
the only NATO member without noncommissioned officers and other
ranks. As a rule, every military member in Norway, except conscripted
soldiers, has been an officer. This has changed too.

Transformation and the Way Ahead

Norway was initially a reluctant member of the coalition of the
willing. Afghanistan was not a place anyone had imagined Norwegian
soldiers would go. Nonetheless, Norway became deeply involved in both
military and civilian matters in Afghanistan. For a while, Norwegian
Kai Eide was even special representative of the Secretary General of the
UN to Afghanistan (2008–10).
During the years in Afghanistan, the Norwegian armed forces were
transformed, particularly the army. Traditionally Norwegians had been
peace supporters, and most of the military casualties it suffered after the
Second World War were traffic accidents and stray bullets. During the
years in Afghanistan, however, the Norwegian Army indeed became a
fighting force, but only in small and rather independent units. Accordingly,
combined arms and joint operations were not on the agenda and have
become something we have to relearn. Provincial reconstruction and
military observation teams will not be the answer if we have to fight for
our own country. It is obviously important to learn from our mistakes,
but it is just as important to learn from the relevant mistakes.
25      NCA, Good Ally, 65.
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